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Salvaging States’ Rights To Protect Children from
Internet Predation: State Power To Regulate Internet
Activity Under the Dormant Commerce Clause
I. INTRODUCTION
In June 2000, the National Center for Missing and Exploited
Children (“NCMEC”) released a sobering report, indicating that sexual
predators on the Internet are targeting more children than previously
thought. The report, entitled Online Victimization: A Report on the
Nation’s Youth,1 concluded that in the United States, approximately one
in five children ages ten to seventeen received a sexual solicitation or
approach over the Internet in the past year alone.2 The study also found
that of children the same age, three percent had received an aggressive
sexual solicitation, meaning that the solicitor had sought to meet the
child, successfully talked to the child on the telephone, or sent the child
letters, money, or gifts.3 One child in seventeen was threatened or
harassed.4 Of children who received such Internet solicitations, twenty1. DAVID FINKELHOR ET AL., CRIMES AGAINST CHILDREN RESEARCH CENTER, ONLINE
VICTIMIZATION: A REPORT ON THE NATION’S YOUTH (2000), available at
http://www.missingkids.com/en_US/publications/NC62.pdf [hereinafter ONLINE VICTIMIZATION].
The studies included in the report were supported by a congressional grant to the National Center for
Missing and Exploited Children. Id.
2. Id. at ix. These statistics are based on a representative sample of 1,501 children who use
the Internet regularly. Id. Specifically, nineteen percent of the children surveyed reported receiving a
sexual solicitation while using the Internet. Id. at 1. Three percent of respondents claimed to have
created a friendship with an adult over the Internet. Id. at 2.
Girls were targeted for sexual solicitation sixty-six percent of the time, while only thirty-four
percent of targeted victims were boys. Id. Most of the targeted youth were over the age of fourteen,
but the twenty-two percent who were ages ten to thirteen found the episodes to be much more
distressing. Id.
Although only twenty-four percent of solicitations came from adults, the report indicates that
this statistic may be misleading because “given the anonymity the Internet provides, . . . individuals
may easily hide or misrepresent themselves.” Id. at 3. And, in fact, in twenty-seven percent of the
cases, the child did not know the age of the person making the solicitation. Id.
3. Id. at ix. Of the aggressive solicitors, thirty-four percent identified themselves as adults to
the victims. Id. at 3. In ten percent of the cases, the solicitor would ask to meet the child, and in two
percent of the cases, the solicitor would call the child. Id. at 4.
4. Id. at ix. Boys and girls were targeted for harassment in nearly equal proportions (fiftyone percent and forty-eight percent, respectively). Id. at 21. A majority of harassing episodes
(seventy percent) were targeted at children between the ages of fourteen and seventeen. Id.
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five percent reported the incident to a parent, but fewer than ten percent
of the victims ever reported these sexual solicitations to law enforcement
authorities or to the Internet provider.5
In light of these problems, the report concluded that many traditional
attempt and solicitation statutes may not sufficiently address Internet
solicitation and that “[a]lthough it is a daunting task, criminal statutes
need to be systematically reviewed with the Internet in mind to make
sure that relevant statutes cover Internet behaviors.”6 In response to these
concerns, state legislatures have revised their criminal statutes to create a
new species of crime called “Internet luring,” or “enticement.”7 Such a
crime is patterned after the traditional crimes of solicitation and attempt
but specifically addresses the sexual solicitation of a minor over the
Internet.
However, a recent series of federal cases threatens the validity of
these statutes. Several federal courts have held that similar state laws,
which prohibit the dissemination of pornography to minors via the
Internet, are per se invalid under the dormant Commerce Clause because
they impose an undue burden on interstate commerce. The severe
limitation on state police power posed by these decisions threatens to
block the ability of state governments to protect their citizens. As one
scholar explained, “the dormant Commerce Clause argument, if
accepted, threatens to invalidate nearly every state regulation of Internet
communications . . . . This explains why the dormant Commerce Clause
has been called a ‘nuclear bomb of a legal theory’ against state Internet
regulations.”8
Although luring statutes have not yet been struck down under the
dormant Commerce Clause, this line of reasoning provides Internet
predators with grounds to challenge the constitutionality of these statutes.
This Comment concludes that such challenges should fail because the per
se approach used by certain federal courts is not warranted by Supreme
Court jurisprudence.9 As such, courts should rely on the balancing

5.
6.
7.
8.

Id. at ix.
Id. at 40.
See infra Part II.A.
Jack L. Goldsmith & Alan O. Sykes, The Internet and the Dormant Commerce Clause,
110 YALE L.J. 785, 787 (2001) (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Declan McCullagh,
Brick
by
Brick,
TIME
DIGITAL
DAILY
(Jan.
31,
1997),
at
http://www.time.com/time/digital/daily/0,2822,11738,00.html).
9. See infra Part III.A.
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approach set forth in Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc.,10 which would
generally uphold state regulation of the Internet stemming from a
legitimate concern to protect minors from sexual predation.
Part II of this Comment describes state Internet luring statutes and
the Supreme Court’s dormant Commerce Clause jurisprudence, and Part
III demonstrates the confusion resulting from the divergent federal and
state applications of the dormant Commerce Clause to state Internet
regulation. Part IV argues that the per se approach used by federal courts
is improper in this context and that the Pike balancing test provides a
more suitable analysis. Finally, Part V offers a brief conclusion that
reviews the constitutionality and necessity of state Internet statutes.
II. BACKGROUND
A. Internet Luring Statutes
Many states have recently enacted what may be termed Internet
luring statutes, which criminalize any attempt to knowingly solicit a
minor to engage in sexual activity by communicating through the
Internet.11 These statutes come in a variety of forms but generally punish

10. 397 U.S. 137, 142 (1970) (“Where the statute regulates even-handedly to effectuate a
legitimate local public interest, and its effects on interstate commerce are only incidental, it will be
upheld unless the burden imposed on such commerce is clearly excessive in relation to the putative
local benefits.”).
11. To date, seventeen states have enacted Internet luring statutes:
[A] person is guilty of solicitation of a child by a computer if the person is 19 years of
age or older and the person knowingly, with the intent to commit an unlawful sex act,
entices, induces, persuades, seduces, prevails, advises, coerces, or orders, by means of a
computer, a child who is less than 16 years of age and at least three years younger than
the defendant, to meet with the defendant or any other person for the purpose of engaging
in sexual intercourse, sodomy, or to engage in a sexual performance, obscene sexual
performance, or sexual conduct for his or her benefit.
ALA. CODE § 13A-6-110(a) (2004);
(a) A person commits computer child pornography if the person . . . (2) Knowingly
utilizes a computer online service, Internet service, or local bulletin board service to
seduce, solicit, lure, or entice or attempt to seduce, solicit, lure or entice a child or
another individual believed by the person to be a child, to engage in sexually explicit
conduct.
ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-27-603(a)(2) (Michie 2003);
A person is guilty of enticing a minor when such person uses an interactive computer
service to knowingly persuade, induce, entice or coerce any person under sixteen years of
age to engage in prostitution or sexual activity for which the actor may be charged with a
criminal offense.
CONN. GEN. STAT. § 53a-90a(a) (2003);
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A person is guilty of sexual solicitation of a child if the person, being 18 years of age or
older, intentionally or knowingly . . . transmits, receives, exchanges, . . . including by
means of computer, any notice, statement, document, advertisement, file or data
containing the name, . . . e-mail address, . . . or other descriptive or identifying
information pertaining to any child who has not yet reached his or her sixteenth birthday
for the purpose of facilitating, encouraging, offering or soliciting a prohibited sexual act
involving such child and such person or any other person.
DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 1112A(a)(3) (2004);
Any person who knowingly utilizes a computer on-line service, Internet service, or local
bulletin board service to seduce, solicit, lure, or entice, or attempt to seduce, solicit, lure,
or entice, a child or another person believed by the person to be a child, to commit any
illegal act . . . relating to sexual battery[,] . . . relating to lewdness and indecent
exposure[,] or . . . relating to child abuse, commits a felony of the third degree . . . .
FL. STAT. ch. 847.0135(3) (2004);
Any person who, using a computer or any other electronic device: (a) Intentionally or
knowingly communicates (i) With a minor known by the person to be under the age of
eighteen years; (ii) With another person, in reckless disregard of the risk that the other
person is under the age of eighteen years, and the other person is under the age of
eighteen years; or (iii) With another person who represents that person to be under the
age of eighteen years; and (b) With the intent to promote or facilitate the commission of a
felony . . . ; and (c) Intentionally or knowingly travels to the agreed upon meeting place at
the agreed upon meeting time; is guilty of electronic enticement of a child in the first
degree.
HAW. REV. STAT. § 707-756(1) (2003);
Any person who, using a computer or any other electronic device: (a) Intentionally or
knowingly communicates (i) With a minor known by the person to be under the age of
eighteen years; (ii) With another person, in reckless disregard of the risk that the other
person is under the age of eighteen years, and the other person is under the age of
eighteen years; or (iii) With another person who represents that person to be under the
age of eighteen years; and (b) With the intent to promote or facilitate the commission of a
felony, agrees to meet with the minor, or with another person who represents that person
to
be
a
minor
under
the
age
of
eighteen
years
. . . ; and (c) Intentionally or knowingly travels to the agreed upon meeting place at the
agreed upon meeting time; is guilty of electronic enticement of a child in the second
degree.
id. § 707-757(1);
(a) As used in this section, “solicit” means to command, authorize, urge, incite, request,
or advise an individual . . . by using a computer network . . . to perform an act described
in subsection (b).
(b) A person eighteen (18) years of age or older who knowingly or intentionally solicits a
child under fourteen (14) years of age, or an individual the person believes to be a child
under fourteen (14) years of age, to engage in: (1) sexual intercourse; (2) deviate sexual
conduct; or (3) any fondling or touching intended to arouse or satisfy the sexual desires
of either the child or the older person; commits child solicitation, a Class D felony.
IND. CODE § 35-42-6 (2004);
1-A. A person is guilty of soliciting a child by a computer to commit a prohibited act if:
A. The actor: (1) Uses a computer knowingly to solicit, entice, persuade or compel
another person to meet with the actor; (2) Is at least 16 years of age; (3) Knows or
believes that the other person is less than 14 years of age; and (4) Is at least 3 years
older than the expressed age of the other person; and
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B. The actor has the intent to engage in any one of the following prohibited acts
with the other person: (1) A sexual act; . . . (2) Sexual contact; . . . or (3) Sexual
exploitation of a minor . . . .
ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 17-A, § 259 (Supp. 2004);
(3)(a) A person is guilty of computer luring when:
(i) Knowing the character and content of any communication of sexually oriented
material, he intentionally uses any computer communication system allowing the
input, output, examination or transfer of computer data or computer programs from
one computer to another, to initiate or engage in such communication with a person
under the age of eighteen (18); and
(ii) By means of such communication he importunes, invites or induces a person
under the age of eighteen (18) years to engage in sexual intercourse, deviant sexual
intercourse or sexual contact with him, or to engage in a sexual performance,
obscene sexual performance or sexual conduct for his benefit.
MISS. CODE ANN. § 97-5-27(3)(a) (2004);
(1) No person shall knowingly solicit, coax, entice, or lure (a) a child sixteen years of age
or younger or (b) a peace officer who is believed by such person to be a child sixteen
years of age or younger, by means of a computer . . . , to engage in an act which would
[constitute sexual assault].
NEB. REV. STAT. § 28-320.02 (2004);
4. A person who violates or attempts to violate the provisions of this section through the
use of a computer, system, or network: (a) With the intent to engage in sexual conduct
with the child or mentally ill person or to cause the child or mentally ill person to engage
in sexual conduct, is guilty of a . . . felony . . . .
NEV. REV. STAT. 201.560.4 (2004);
Any person who knowingly utilizes a computer on-line service, Internet service, or local
bulletin board service to seduce, solicit, lure, or entice, or attempt to seduce, lure, or
entice, a child or another person believed by the person to be a child, to commit any of
the following is guilty of a class B felony:
I. Any offense . . . relative to sexual assault and related offenses.
II. Indecent exposure and lewdness . . . .
III. Endangering a child . . . .
N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 649-B:4 (2004);
Child luring consists of a person knowing and intentionally inducing a child under
sixteen years of age, by means of computer, to engage in sexual intercourse, sexual
contact or in a sexual or obscene performance, or to engage in any other sexual conduct
when the perpetrator is at least three years older than the child.
N.M. STAT. ANN. § 30-37-3.2(B) (Michie 2004);
(a) Offense.—A person is guilty of solicitation of a child by a computer if the person is
16 years of age or older and the person knowingly, with the intent to commit an unlawful
sex act, entices, advises, coerces, orders, or commands, by means of a computer, a child
who is less than 16 years of age and at least 3 years younger than the defendant, to meet
with the defendant or any other person for the purpose of committing an unlawful sex act.
(b) Jurisdiction.—The offense is committed in the State for purposes of determining
jurisdiction, if the transmission that constitutes the offense either originates in the State or
is received in the State.
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-202.3 (2004);
An adult is guilty of luring minors by computer when:
(1) The adult knows the character and content of a communication that, in whole or in
part, implicitly or explicitly discusses or depicts actual or simulated nudity, sexual acts,
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any person who (1) uses a computer or similar device; (2) to contact a
person whom he knows or believes to be a minor; (3) to solicit,
encourage, entice, or lure him or her; (4) for the purposes of engaging in
sexual activity in violation of state laws.12
Internet luring statutes are necessary because most state statutes
punishing the solicitation or attempted rape of minors impose stringent
requirements on state prosecutors. Many attempt statutes, for example,
require that evidence strongly corroborate an intent to commit a crime.13
sexual contact . . . and uses any computer communication system that allows the input,
output, examination, or transfer of computer data or computer programs from one
computer to another to initiate or engage in such communication with a person the adult
believes to be a minor; and (2) By means of that communication the adult importunes,
invites, or induces a person the adult believes to be a minor to engage in sexual acts or to
have sexual contact with the adult, or to engage in a sexual performance, obscene sexual
performance, or sexual conduct for the adult’s benefit, satisfaction, lust, passions, or
sexual desires.
N.D. CENT. CODE § 12.1-20-05.1 (2003);
(1) A person commits enticement of a minor over the Internet when the person knowingly
uses a computer to solicit, seduce, lure, or entice, or attempts to use a computer to solicit,
seduce, lure, or entice a minor or a person the defendant believes to be a minor to engage
in any sexual activity which is a violation of state criminal law. (2) It is not a defense to
the crime of enticing a minor under Subsection (1), or an attempt to commit this offense,
that a law enforcement officer or an undercover operative who is working with a law
enforcement agency was involved in the detection or investigation of the offense.
UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-4-401 (2004);
(1) Whoever uses a computerized communication system to communicate with an
individual who the actor believes or has reason to believe has not attained the age of 16
years with intent to have sexual contact or sexual intercourse with the individual . . . is
guilty of a Class D felony. (2) This section does not apply if, at the time of the
communication, the actor reasonably believed that the age of the person to whom the
communication was sent was no more than 24 months less than the age of the actor.
WIS. STAT. § 948.075 (2004). The federal government has also enacted legislation prohibiting the
sexual enticement of minors:
(b) Whoever, using the mail or any facility or means of interstate or foreign commerce . .
. knowingly persuades, induces, entices, or coerces any individual who has not attained
the age of 18 years, to engage in prostitution or any sexual activity for which any person
can be charged with a criminal offense, or attempts to do so, shall be fined . . . and
imprisoned.
18 U.S.C. § 2422 (2004).
12. Notably, Hawaii requires the additional element that the defendant travels to an agreed
meeting place at an agreed time. See HAW REV. STAT. § 707-756, -757 (2004).
13. Generally,
[a] defendant’s “act” qualifies as an attempt when, for example, it constitutes a
“substantial step”, and “overt act”, or an “act” toward the commission of a crime; or
when it “tends to effect” the commission of a crime. In accordance with some statutes, an
act amounts to a “substantial step” only if “it is strongly corroborative of the actor’s
criminal purpose.”
CHARLES E. TORCIA, WHARTON’S CRIMINAL LAW § 696 (15th ed. 1996 & Supp. 2004).
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Internet luring statutes, on the other hand, require a reduced evidentiary
burden14 and consequently impose a lesser penalty on the perpetrator.15
Thus, Internet luring statutes allow states to convict predators whose
sexual enticement of minors would otherwise fail to meet the solicitation
or attempt requirements.16
B. The Dormant Commerce Clause
State regulation of the Internet presents issues of federalism,
particularly under the Commerce Clause. The Commerce Clause grants
Congress the power “[t]o regulate Commerce . . . among the several
States”17 and is traditionally understood to have two facets: an
affirmative power and a negative power. On one hand, the affirmative
grant of power allows Congress to regulate interstate and foreign
commerce.18 Courts and Congress have interpreted interstate commerce
to include a variety of technologies in transporting materials and signals,

14. Unlike attempt statutes, Internet luring statutes do not require evidence of a “substantial
step.” The prosecutor need only prove that the defendant knowingly used a computer to
communicate with a person the defendant believed to be a minor and that the defendant intended on
engaging in sexual activity with the minor. Compare supra note 11 (listing state statutes) with supra
note 13 (describing state attempt statutes).
15. Generally, penalties for Internet luring are reduced by one degree from the underlying
crime. See, e.g., UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-4-401 (2004).
16. The Utah Court of Appeals provides an explanation of the distinction between traditional
solicitation or attempt statutes and Internet luring:
For example, the crime of Internet [luring] would be more appropriate in a case where, as
here, a defendant solicits sex from an undercover police officer on the Internet believing
he is communicating with a minor. In such a case, attempt, conspiracy, and solicitation
may be difficult to prove because the State must establish the defendant’s actions are
“strongly corroborative” of an intent to commit a felony or involve an “overt act.” The
charge of Internet enticement would be more appropriate because it does not require
“strong corroboration” of intent.
In contrast, the defendant may contact a minor via the Internet, meet the minor, and
be on the verge of consummating a felonious sexual act with the minor before being
stopped by police. In that case, the higher crime of attempt, for example, would be
appropriate because the State could probably prove “strong corroboration” of an intent to
commit the underlying felony.
State v. Ansari, 2004 UT App. 326, 100 P.3d 231, 237–38 (citations omitted).
17. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
18. This power is generally divided into three categories: (1) power to “regulate the use of
the channels of interstate commerce,” (2) power to “regulate and protect the instrumentalities of
interstate commerce, or persons or things in interstate commerce,” and (3) “power to regulate those
activities having a substantial relation to interstate commerce.” United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S.
598, 609 (2000) (citations omitted) (quoting United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 558–59 (1995));
see also Pierce County v. Guillen, 537 U.S. 129, 147 (2003).
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including telecommunications.19 On the other hand, the “negative” or
“dormant” aspect 20 of the Commerce Clause prohibits states from
enacting any law that “discriminates against or unduly burdens interstate
commerce and thereby imped[es] free private trade in the national
marketplace.”21 Thus, courts may presume that state action is prohibited
even though Congress has not enacted pertinent legislation.
.

1. Dormant Commerce Clause analysis
Dormant Commerce Clause jurisprudence has developed into two
primary tests. First, courts consider whether the regulation is facially
discriminatory against out-of-state commerce, in which case the state
regulation is subject to “the strictest of scrutiny of any purported
legitimate local purpose and of the absence of nondiscriminatory
alternatives.”22 Since discriminatory regulations seldom, if ever,
withstand strict scrutiny, courts typically consider them per se invalid.23
Second, if a state statute is not facially discriminatory, it may still be
invalid if it unduly burdens interstate commerce. In Pike v. Bruce
Church, Inc.,24 the Supreme Court articulated the test for determining
19. See, e.g., Adair v. United States, 208 U.S. 161, 177 (1907) (noting that the Commerce
Clause allows Congress to regulate “traffic, intercourse, trade, navigation, communication, the
transit of persons and the transmission of messages by telegraph”). Congress has also included
telecommunications as modes of interstate commerce as explained in its legislative findings to the
Telecommunications Act. See 47 U.S.C. § 901(b) (2001).
20. Gen. Motors v. Tracy, 519 U.S. 278, 287 (1997) (noting that the dormant aspect of the
Commerce Clause is only triggered when the burden on interstate commerce is excessive).
21. Id. at 287 (alteration in original) (citation omitted). For a more general overview of the
purposes of the dormant Commerce Clause, see Goldsmith & Sykes, supra note 8, at 2.
22. Hughes v. Oklahoma, 441 U.S. 322, 337 (1979) (striking down an Oklahoma statute
favoring in-state over out-of-state minnow fishers on grounds of facial discrimination).
23. Philadelphia v. New Jersey, 437 U.S. 617, 623–24 (1978) (“The opinions of the Court
through the years have reflected an alertness to the evils of ‘economic isolation’ and protectionism,
while at the same time recognizing that incidental burdens on interstate commerce may be
unavoidable when a State legislates to safeguard the health and safety of its people. Thus, where
simple economic protectionism is effected by state legislation, a virtually per se rule of invalidity has
been erected. The clearest example of such legislation is a law that overtly blocks the flow of
interstate commerce at a State’s borders.” (citations omitted)).
Examples of invalid state statutes include those aimed at erecting barriers to outside
competition, such as in Baldwin v. G.A.F. Seelig, Inc., 294 U.S. 511 (1935); keeping industries in the
state to promote job growth, as in Foster-Fountain Packing Co. v. Haydel, 278 U.S. 1 (1928);
advantaging local companies with a compensatory tax, as in So. Cent. Bell Tel. Co. v. Alabama, 526
U.S. 160 (1999); requiring businesses to use state products, as in Wyoming v. Oklahoma, 502 U.S.
437 (1992); or preventing the export of state resources, as in New England Power Co. v. New
Hampshire, 455 U.S. 331 (1982).
24. 397 U.S. 137 (1970).
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when state regulations unduly burden interstate commerce, explaining
that “[w]here the statute regulates even-handedly to effectuate a
legitimate local public interest, and its effects on interstate commerce are
only incidental, it will be upheld unless the burden imposed on such
commerce is clearly excessive in relation to the putative local
benefits.”25 The Court went on to indicate that these factors were to be
assessed as part of a balancing test:
If a legitimate local purpose is found, then the question becomes one of
degree. And the extent of the burden that will be tolerated will of
course depend on the nature of the local interest involved, and on
whether it could be promoted as well with a lesser impact on interstate
activities. Occasionally the Court has candidly undertaken a balancing
approach in resolving these issues, but more frequently it has spoken in
terms of “direct” and “indirect” effects and burdens.26

The difficulties of performing such a balance and determining the
appropriate “weight” of its different elements were illustrated in Kassel
v. Consolidated Freightways Corp.,27 a plurality opinion in which the
Justices divided over how to factor a state’s interest in public safety. The
case involved an Iowa law limiting the length of trucks passing through
the state, a law that the state claimed was motivated by safety concerns.28
Justice Powell’s opinion, which received four votes,29 emphasized that a
state’s interest in health and safety is a substantial factor in determining
the extent of a state’s police power: “[A] State’s power to regulate
commerce is never greater than in matters traditionally of local
concern,”30 and, in particular, a state’s interest in safety is among “those
that ‘the Court has been most reluctant to invalidate.’”31 Those
challenging such interests must “overcome a ‘strong presumption of
validity,’”32 but the Powell opinion also warned that “the incantation of a
purpose to promote the public health or safety does not insulate a state
25. Id. at 142 (citing Huron Portland Cement Co. v. Detroit, 362 U.S. 440, 443 (1960)).
26. Id. (citing So. Pac. Co. v. Arizona, 325 U.S. 761 (1945); Shafer v. Farmers Grain Co.,
268 U.S. 189 (1925)).
27. 450 U.S. 662 (1981).
28. Consolidated Freightways, a major nationwide trucking company, challenged an Iowa
statute prohibiting the use of “65-foot doubles” within its borders. Id. at 664–65. Because most of
the states in the Midwest permitted such trucks, Consolidated would be forced to switch its fleet to
either fifty-five foot singles or sixty-foot doubles, or change trucks before entering Iowa. Id.
29. Justice Powell was joined by Justices White, Blackmun, and Stevens. Id. at 664.
30. Id. at 670 (citing Hunt v. Wash. Apple Adver. Comm’n, 432 U.S. 333, 350 (1977)).
31. Id. (quoting Raymond Motor Trans., Inc. v. Rice, 434 U.S. 429, 443 (1978)).
32. Id. (quoting Bibb v. Navajo Freight Lines, Inc., 359 U.S. 520, 524 (1959)).
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law from Commerce Clause attack.”33 Powell concluded that a court’s
analysis should include “a sensitive consideration of the weight and
nature of the state regulatory concern in light of the extent of the burden
imposed on the course of interstate commerce.”34 In striking down the
statute, Justice Powell concluded that the state’s safety interest was
insufficient to justify its burden on interstate commerce for two reasons.
First, the state was unable to prove that sixty-five-foot double trailers
were less safe than fifty-five-foot single trailers. Second, the Court also
noted that the Iowa law was “out of step with the laws of all other
Midwestern and Western States.”35
In a concurring opinion, Justice Brennan36 seemed generally to agree
with Justice Powell’s approach but explained that “[t]he burdens
imposed on commerce must be balanced against the local benefits
actually sought to be achieved by the State’s lawmakers, and not against
those suggested after the fact by counsel.”37 In a dissenting opinion,
Justice Rehnquist 38 warned that any “balancing” of safety versus costs to
commerce is an illusion.39 Rather, the court must give deference to the
safety determination of the state unless it is “merely a pretext for
discrimination against interstate commerce.”40
In sum, Kassel demonstrates the Court’s willingness to recognize a
state’s safety interest but leaves unclear how much weight that interest
should be given. This ambiguity suggests that the relative importance of
the state safety interest should be determined on a case-by-case basis.
.

33. Id.
34. Id. at 670–71 (quoting Raymond, 434 U.S. at 441).
35. Id. at 671.
36. Justice Brennan was joined by Justice Marshall. Id. at 679.
37. Id. at 679–80. (“For me, analysis of Commerce Clause challenges to state regulations
must take into account three principles: (1) The courts are not empowered to second-guess the
empirical judgments of lawmakers concerning the utility of legislation. (2) The burdens imposed on
commerce must be balanced against the local benefits actually sought to be achieved by the State’s
lawmakers, and not against those suggested after the fact by counsel. (3) Protectionist legislation is
unconstitutional under the Commerce Clause, even if the burdens and benefits are related to safety
rather than economics.”).
38. Id. at 687. Justice Rehnquist was joined by Chief Justice Burger and Justice Stewart.
39. Id. at 691 (noting the impropriety of attempting to “directly compare safety benefits to
commerce costs and strik[ing] down the legislation if the latter can be said in some vague sense to
‘outweigh’ the former”).
40. Id. at 692. Justice Rehnquist went on to explain that evidence of pretext exists when the
state’s safety benefits are “slight or problematical.” Id.
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2. Additional considerations
In recent years, the Court has taken into account additional
considerations without explaining how they affect the Pike balancing
analysis. Primary among these factors is concern for state regulations
that either (1) regulate wholly extraterritorial activity or (2) subject users
of interstate commerce to inconsistent regulations.
a. Extraterritorial effect. First, the Court has scrutinized state
legislation that allows a state to enforce its regulatory standards
extraterritorially. In Healy v. Beer Institute, the Court struck down a
Connecticut statute that, in essence, required out-of-state beer shippers to
establish on a monthly basis that their prices were not higher than those
in the three neighboring states.41 Although the Court concluded that the
statute was facially discriminatory against interstate beer shippers,42 the
Court also explained that “the ‘Commerce Clause . . . precludes the
application of a state statute to commerce that takes place wholly outside
of the State’s borders.’”43 Such state statutes “exceed[] the inherent
limits of the enacting State’s authority and [are] invalid regardless of
whether the statute’s extraterritorial reach was intended by the
legislature.”44 In sum, “[t]he critical inquiry is whether the practical
effect of the regulation is to control conduct beyond the boundaries of the
State.”45
b. Inconsistent regulation of interstate commerce. Second, the Court
has expressed a concern that certain forms of state regulation “adversely
affect interstate commerce by subjecting activities to inconsistent

41. 491 U.S. 324, 326–27 (1989).
42. Id. at 340–41.
43. Id. at 336 (quoting Edgar v. MITE Corp., 457 U.S. 624, 642–43 (1982) (omission in
original)). The Court concluded that the Connecticut statute had “the practical effect of controlling
Massachusetts prices” because “when a brewer posts his . . . prices for Massachusetts, that brewer
must take account of the price he hopes to charge in Connecticut.” Id. at 338; see also Edgar, 457
U.S. at 643 (plurality opinion) (“[A]ny attempt ‘directly’ to assert extraterritorial jurisdiction over
persons or property would offend sister States and exceed the inherent limits of the State’s power.”
(quoting Schaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186, 197 (1977))).
44. Healy, 491 U.S. at 336. Justice Cardozo summed up this concern by noting that “New
York has no power to project its legislation into Vermont by regulating the price to be paid in that
state for milk acquired there.” Baldwin v. G.A.F. Seelig, Inc., 294 U.S. 511, 521 (1935).
45. Healy, 491 U.S. at 336 (citing Brown-Forman Distillers Corp. v. N.Y. State Liquor Auth.,
476 U.S. 573, 579 (1986)).
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regulations.”46 In Healy, the Court recognized that “the Commerce
Clause protects against inconsistent legislation arising from the
projection of one state[’s] regulatory regime into the jurisdiction of
another State.”47 Although not specifying the necessary factors to
consider, the Court emphasized its desire to avoid the scenario in which
“an out-of-state merchant [must] seek regulatory approval in one State
before undertaking a transaction in another.”48
Although the Court’s consideration of the extraterritorial effects and
inconsistent regulations resulting from state laws appears to be an
important aspect of the dormant Commerce Clause analysis, it remains
unclear whether these play a part in the Pike balance or whether they
stand as independent tests.49 Commentators have acknowledged this
confusion and have also noted, moreover, that the exact scope of these
two factors is uncertain because most businesses expect to operate under
some degree of inconsistent extraterritorial regulations.50
III. RECENT DECISIONS REGARDING STATE REGULATION
OF THE INTERNET
Recent cases in which federal courts have greatly reduced the ability
of states to regulate the Internet have called into question the
constitutional viability of state Internet luring statutes. However, several
state courts have asserted the rights of states to regulate the Internet when
the state has a strong local interest. This has created a conflicting body of
case law that threatens to impede, or at least confuse, a state’s ability to
protect minors from Internet predation.
46. CTS Corp. v. Dynamics Corp. of Am., 481 U.S. 69, 88 (1987) (finding that differing
regulations from state to state does not necessarily imply problematic inconsistent regulations).
47. Healy, 491 U.S. at 336–37 (citing CTS Corp. v. Dynamics Corp. of Am., 481 U.S. 69,
88–89 (1987)).
48. Id. at 337 (citing Brown-Forman, 476 U.S at 582).
49. See Goldsmith & Sykes, supra note 8, at 789–90 (citing Daniel R. Fischel, From MITE
to CTS: State Anti-Takeover Statutes, the Williams Act, the Commerce Clause, and Insider Trading,
1987 SUP. CT. REV. 47, 88–90; Donald H. Regan, Siamese Essays: (I) CTS Corp. v. Dynamics Corp.
of America and Dormant Commerce Clause Doctrine; (II) Extraterritorial State Legislation, 85
MICH. L. REV. 1865, 1884 (1987)).
50. Id. at 790 (“[F]irms that operate in interstate commerce often face different regulations in
different states. To take two of dozens of examples, the dormant Commerce Clause permits states to
apply local conceptions of tort law (say, strict liability) to multistate corporate activity with a local
contact, even if other states apply different tort regimes (say, negligence), and it permits states to
apply different blue-sky laws to the same multistate securities offering.” (citing Edgar v. MITE
Corp., 457 U.S. 624, 641 (1982))).
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A. Federal Cases: State Regulation of the Internet Per Se Invalid
Beginning with American Library Ass’n v. Pataki,51 federal courts
have adopted an approach that makes state regulation of the Internet per
se invalid. Although federal courts have not yet reviewed the validity of
state Internet luring statutes, they have struck down other statutes
intended to protect minors from sexually explicit and harmful Internet
material. Nonetheless, the following discussion ends by noting that this
trend may be weakening, as evidenced by the Fourth Circuit’s recent
holding in which it relies on Pataki, yet opts to apply the Pike balancing
test.
1. American Library Ass’n v. Pataki
In one of the most influential cases on this issue, a New York district
court in American Library Ass’n v. Pataki determined that a state statute
outlawing the dissemination of pornography to minors was per se invalid
because the state law imposed, at least in theory, its limits
extraterritorially to all Internet users.52 In Pataki, a group of individuals
and organizations—who regularly use the Internet to communicate,
disseminate, and display information—brought an action challenging a
New York statute (the “New York Act”) criminalizing the dissemination
of information that is harmful to minors.53 The plaintiffs claimed the

51. 969 F. Supp. 160 (S.D.N.Y. 1997).
52. Id.
53. Id. at 161–62; see also N.Y. PENAL LAW § 235.21(3) (McKinney 2004). The Act in
question amended section 235.21 of the New York Penal Law. Dissemination of Indecent Material
to Minors Through Any Computer Communication System § 5, 1996 N.Y. Laws 600 § 210-E
(codified at N.Y. PENAL LAW § 235.21). The amendment added a new subdivision, making it a
crime for an individual:
Knowing the character and content of the communication which, in whole or in part,
depicts actual or simulated nudity, sexual conduct or sado-masochistic abuse, and which
is harmful to minors, [to] intentionally use[] any computer communication system
allowing the input, output, examination or transfer, of computer data or computer
programs from one computer to another, to initiate or engage in such communication
with a person who is a minor.
N.Y. PENAL LAW § 235.21 (McKinney 2004). Violation of the Act is a Class E felony, punishable
by one to four years of incarceration. The Act applies to both commercial and noncommercial
dissemination of materials. Section 235.20(6) defines “harmful to minors” as:
that quality of any description or representation, in whatever form, of nudity, sexual
conduct, sexual excitement, or sado-masochistic abuse, when it:
(a) Considered as a whole, appeals to the prurient interest in sex of minors; and
(b) Is patently offensive to prevailing standards in the adult community as a whole
with respect to what is suitable material for minors; and
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New York Act was unconstitutional because it unduly burdened
interstate commerce,54 and the court agreed, holding that the statute was
per se invalid.55 To further support its conclusion, the court held in the
alternative that the statute was invalid under the Pike balancing test.56
a. Per se analysis. The court began by reasoning that, as an
“information superhighway,” the Internet is “an instrument of interstate
commerce, albeit an innovative one,”57 and therefore naturally triggers
dormant Commerce Clause concerns.58 Relying heavily on Healy, the
court then determined that the New York Act was “per se violative of the
Commerce Clause”59 because any incident of extraterritorial regulation
automatically invalidates a state statute. In essence, the nature of the
Internet makes “it impossible to restrict the effects of the New York Act
to conduct occurring within New York.”60 Therefore, “conduct that may
be legal in the state in which the user acts can subject the user to
prosecution in New York and thus subordinate the user’s home state’s
policy—perhaps favoring freedom of expression over a more protective
stance—to New York’s local concerns.”61
b. Pike balancing and inconsistent regulations. The court further
explained that even if the Act were not a per se violation of the
Commerce Clause on grounds of its extraterritorial impact, the Act
would fail under the Pike balancing test because “the burdens it imposes
on interstate commerce are excessive in relation to the local benefits it
confers.”62 In applying this test, the court readily accepted the
“quintessentially legitimate state objective” of protecting children against
(c) Considered as a whole, lacks serious literary, artistic, political and scientific
value for minors.
N.Y. PENAL LAW § 235.20(6) (McKinney 2004).
54. Pataki, 969 F. Supp. at 161. Plaintiffs also asserted a First Amendment argument, which
the court declined to address. Id. at 183.
55. Id. at 177.
56. Id. at 177–81.
57. Id. at 161, 173.
58. Id. at 169, 173.
59. Id. at 177. The court also relied on Edgar v. MITE Corp., 457 U.S. 624, 642 (1982), a
case which concluded that an Illinois statute was a “direct restraint on interstate commerce and . . .
ha[d] a sweeping extraterritorial effect” because the statute would prevent a tender offeror from
communicating its offer to shareholders both within and outside of Illinois.
60. Pataki, 969 F. Supp. at 177.
61. Id.
62. Id. at 177.
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pedophilia,63 but ultimately determined that “[t]he local benefits likely to
result from the New York Act are not overwhelming.”64 The Act would
“almost certainly fail to accomplish” the state interest of protecting
minors from sexual material on the Internet because “nearly half of
Internet communications originate outside the United States, and some
percentage of that figure represents pornography.”65
Similarly, the court noted that the benefits of the Act are attenuated
because New York would have difficulty asserting jurisdiction over
parties whose only contact with the state occurred through incidental
Internet communications.66 Next, the court considered the extreme
burden resulting from the Act—primarily the chilling effect on Internet
users worldwide.67 Based on the above factors, the court concluded that
the “severe burden on interstate commerce . . . is not justifiable in light
of the attenuated local benefits arising from it.”68 Finally, the court noted
that “certain types of commerce demand consistent treatment and are
therefore susceptible to regulation only on a national level”69 because
any state’s regulation is likely to conflict with laws enacted by any other

63. Id. (citing New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747, 756–57 (1982)) (“It is evident beyond the
need for elaboration that a State’s interest in ‘safeguarding the physical and psychological wellbeing of a minor’ is ‘compelling.’” (quoting Globe Newspaper Co. v. Superior Court, 457 U.S. 596,
607 (1982))).
64. Id. at 178.
65. Id. (quoting ACLU v. Reno, 929 F. Supp. 824, 882 (E.D. Pa. 1996)).
66. Id.
[I]n the present case, New York’s prosecution of parties from out of state who have
allegedly violated the Act, but whose only contact with New York occurs via the Internet,
is beset with practical difficulties, even if New York is able to exercise criminal
jurisdiction over such parties. The prospect of New York bounty hunters dragging
pedophiles from the other 49 states into New York is not consistent with traditional
concepts of comity.
Id.
67. Id. at 179–80.
The New York Act casts its net worldwide; moreover, the chilling effect that it produces
is bound to exceed the actual cases that are likely to be prosecuted, as Internet users will
steer clear of the Act by [a] significant margin. . . . [The court concluded that] the range
of Internet communications potentially affected by the Act is far broader than the State
suggests.
Id. at 180. “For example, many libraries, museums, and academic institutions [regularly] post art on
the Internet that some might conclude was ‘harmful to minors.’” Id. Furthermore, the costs incurred
by organizations and institutions to comply with the Act are excessive. Id.
68. Id. at 181.
69. Id. (emphasis added).
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state and because such inconsistent regulation can “only result in
chaos.”70
2. Post-Pataki federal cases
The Pataki analysis provided the framework for subsequent federal
cases involving challenges to Internet statutes. To date, few federal
circuits have reviewed dormant Commerce Clause challenges to state
Internet regulations protecting minors, yet of those that have, each has
adopted the Pataki per se line of reasoning.
a. ACLU v. Johnson. Two years after Pataki, the Tenth Circuit in
ACLU v. Johnson invalidated an Internet dissemination statute as per se
unconstitutional.71 Following the dormant Commerce Clause analysis in
Pataki, the Tenth Circuit struck down a New Mexico statute designed to
criminalize the dissemination of material by computer that is harmful to
a minor.72 Because the statute at issue represented an attempt to regulate

70. Id. To support its assertion that the Internet requires a “cohesive national scheme of
regulation so that users are reasonably able to determine their obligations,” the court relied heavily
upon numerous historical cases in which “the Supreme Court has acknowledged the need for
coordination in the regulation of certain areas of commerce [e.g., trains, highways].” Id. at 182.
71. 194 F.3d 1149, 1161 (10th Cir. 1999). The case involved various organizations and
individuals who used and accessed the Internet for a variety of purposes. Id. at 1149. Plaintiffs
argued that the New Mexico legislature enacted a statute that limited their “discussions of women’s
health and interests, literary works and fine art, gay and lesbian issues, prison rapes, and censorship
and civil liberties issues.” Id. at 1153. New Mexico contended, however, that the statute, designed to
criminalize the dissemination of sexually explicit material to minors, served the compelling state
interest of protecting minors from harmful material. Id. at 1161.
72. Id. at 1164. The New Mexico legislature enacted section 30-37-3.2(A), which provided as
follows:
Dissemination of material that is harmful to a minor by computer consists of the use of a
computer communications system that allows the input, output, examination or transfer
of computer data or computer programs from one computer to another, to knowingly and
intentionally initiate or engage in communication with a person under eighteen years of
age when such communication in whole or in part depicts actual or simulated nudity,
sexual intercourse or any other sexual conduct. Whoever commits dissemination of
material that is harmful to a minor by computer is guilty of a misdemeanor.
N.M. STAT. ANN. § 30-37-3.2 (Michie 1998). The statute provided the following defenses:
In a prosecution for dissemination of material that is harmful to a minor by computer, it is
a defense that the defendant has:
(1) in good faith taken reasonable, effective and appropriate actions under the
circumstances to restrict or prevent access by minors to indecent materials on
computer, including any method that is feasible with available technology;
(2) restricted access to indecent materials by requiring the use of a verified credit card,
debit account, adult access code or adult personal identification number; or
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interstate commerce occurring outside the borders of New Mexico, the
court invalidated the statute as a per se violation of the Commerce
Clause.73 The court first stated that the statute “contains no express
limitation confining it to communications which occur wholly within its
borders,”74 and thus “applies to any communication, intrastate or
interstate, that fits within the prohibition and over which [New Mexico]
has the capacity to exercise criminal jurisdiction.”75 Accordingly, the
Tenth Circuit agreed with the Pataki court that state Internet regulation
“cannot effectively be limited to purely intrastate communications over
the Internet because no such communications exist.”76
b. American Booksellers Foundation v. Dean. The Second Circuit
also adopted the Pataki reasoning in American Booksellers Foundation v.
Dean, a case involving a Vermont dissemination statute similar to New
Mexico’s.77 The court found that the statute violated the dormant

(3) in good faith established a mechanism such as labeling, segregation or other
means that enables the indecent material to be automatically blocked or screened by
software or other capability reasonably available to persons who wish to effect such
blocking or screening and the defendant has not otherwise solicited a minor not
subject to such screening or blocking capabilities to access the indecent material or
to circumvent screening or blocking.
N.M. STAT. ANN. § 30-38-3.2(C) (Michie 1998).
73. ACLU, 194 F.3d at 1161.
74. Id.
75. Id. (citations omitted) (quoting Am. Library Ass’n v. Pataki, 969 F. Supp. 160, 169–70
(S.D.N.Y. 1997)).
76. Id. (quoting Pataki, 969 F. Supp. at 171). The court further discussed the Pike balancing
test as outlined in Pataki and concluded that the regulation imposed burdens on interstate commerce
that exceeded any local benefits conferred by the statute. Id. at 1161–62. The court also agreed with
Pataki that the regulation violated the Commerce Clause because “it subject[ed] the use of the
Internet to inconsistent regulations.” Id. at 1162.
77. Am. Booksellers Found. v. Dean, 342 F.3d 96, 98 (2d Cir. 2003). Vermont Governor
Howard Dean signed into law Act No. 124, “An Act Relating to Internet Crimes,” in 2000. Id. at 99.
The Act extended title 13, section 2802 of the Vermont statute’s prohibition against distributing to
minors sexually explicit materials that are “harmful to minors” to include distribution or
dissemination through the Internet. Id. In 2001, as a response to plaintiff’s declaratory and injunctive
relief from enforcement of the statute, the Vermont General Assembly passed Act No. 41, which
limited 13 V.S.A. § 2802 to dissemination of indecent material to a minor “in the
presence of a minor” and created a new provision, 13 V.S.A. § 2802a, which prohibited
dissemination to minors of indecent material that is “harmful to minors” when the
dissemination occurs “outside the presence of the minor” but the disseminator has “actual
knowledge” that the recipient is a minor.
Id. (quoting 2001 Vt. Acts & Resolves 41). The entirety of title 13, section 2802a(a) of the Vermont
statute reads as follows:
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Commerce Clause and was per se invalid because of its burden on
interstate commerce. In closely examining the factors that “may burden
interstate commerce,”78 the court concluded that the statute does not
incidentally burden interstate commerce, nor does it “discriminate
against interstate commerce on its face.”79 Instead, Vermont “ha[d]
‘projected its legislation’ into other States, and directly regulated
commerce therein.”80 Accordingly, the Second Circuit struck down the
statute as per se unconstitutional. The court considered only one factor in
its per se analysis: the statute’s extraterritorial effects.81 Similar to
Pataki, the court reasoned that because “[a] person outside Vermont who
posts information on a website or on an electronic discussion group
cannot prevent people in Vermont from accessing the material,” those
“outside Vermont must comply with Section 2802a or risk prosecution
(a) No person may, with knowledge of its character and content, and with actual
knowledge that the recipient is a minor, sell, lend, distribute or give away:
(1) any picture, photograph, drawing, sculpture, motion picture film, or similar visual
representation or image, including any such representation or image which is
communicated, transmitted, or stored electronically, of a person or portion of the human
body which depicts nudity, sexual conduct or sado-masochistic abuse and which is
harmful to minors; or
(2) any book, pamphlet, magazine, printed matter, however reproduced, or sound
recording which contains any matter enumerated in subdivision (1) of this subsection, or
explicit and detailed verbal descriptions or narrative accounts of sexual excitement,
sexual conduct or sado-masochistic abuse and which, taken as a whole, is harmful to
minors.
VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 13, § 2802a(a) (2000). “Harmful to minors” is defined by title 13, section
2801(6) of the Vermont Statutes Annotated as material that:
(A) Predominately appeals to the prurient, shameful or morbid interest of minors; and
(B) Is patently offensive to prevailing standards in the adult community in the state of
Vermont as a whole with respect to what is suitable material for minors; and
(C) . . . [T]aken as a whole, lacks serious literary, artistic, political, or scientific value, for
minors.
VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 13, § 2801(6) (2000).
Sexual Health Network, Inc. (SHN) provided sex-related information, particularly to those
“with disabilities, illnesses, and changes in their lifestyle” and dispersed such information primarily
through an Internet website. See Am. Booksellers Found., 342 F.3d at 98. The Web site contained
information on a variety of sex-related topics, some even considered controversial and inappropriate
for minors. Id. The Vermont government argued that the content was “harmful to minors” because
some of the topics included “sexual addiction, advice for making safe sex practices more erotic,
guidelines on the safe practice of bondage sadomasochistic activities, and information on how those
with disabilities can experience sexual pleasure.” Id.
78. Id. at 102.
79. Id. at 104.
80. Id. (quoting Brown-Forman Distillers Corp. v. N.Y. State Liquor Auth., 476 U.S. 573,
584 (1986)).
81. Id. at 103.
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by Vermont.”82 Consequently, although Vermont intended only to
protect its minors with Section 2802a, Vermont “projected”83 its
regulation on the rest of the nation and forced all citizens of any state to
comply or risk prosecution.84 In reaching its conclusion, the court
emphasized its assumption that the “internet’s boundary-less nature
means that internet commerce does not quite ‘occur[] wholly outside
[Vermont’s] borders.’”85
In the alternative, the court asserted that the statute failed to pass
constitutional muster because “the [Commerce] Clause ‘protects against
inconsistent legislation arising from the projection of one state regulatory
regime into the jurisdiction of another.’”86 The court then reached the
bold conclusion that states have no authority to regulate the Internet:
“We think it likely that the internet will soon be seen as falling within the
class of subjects that are protected from State regulation because they
‘imperatively demand[] a single uniform rule.’”87
c. PSINET, Inc. v. Chapman. Contrary to the per se approach applied
by some other federal circuits, the Fourth Circuit in PSINET, Inc. v.
Chapman utilized the Pike balancing test to strike down a Virginia
dissemination statute.88 Interestingly, the court mentioned Pataki but did

82. Id.; see also Am. Library Ass’n v. Pataki, 969 F. Supp. 160, 171 (S.D.N.Y. 1997) (“An
internet user who posts a Web page cannot prevent New Yorkers or Oklahomans or Iowans from
accessing that page and will not even know from what state visitors to that site hail. Nor can a
participant in a chat room prevent other participants from a particular state from joining the
conversation.”).
83. Am. Booksellers Found., 342 F.3d at 103; see Healy v. Beer Inst., 491 U.S. 324, 332–34
(1989) (“A state law that has the ‘practical effect’ of regulating commerce occurring wholly outside
that State’s borders is invalid under the Commerce Clause . . . . [A state is] ‘prohibited by the
Commerce Clause from project[ing] its legislation into [other States].’” (second and third alterations
in original) (quoting Brown-Forman, 476 U.S. at 583 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting
Baldwin v. G.A.F. Seelig, Inc., 294 U.S. 511, 521 (1935)))).
84. Am. Booksellers Found., 342 F.3d at 103.
85. Id. (quoting Healy, 491 U.S. at 332).
86. Id. at 104 (quoting Healy, 491 U.S. at 337).
87. Id. (quoting Cooley v. Bd. of Wardens, 53 U.S. 299, 319 (1851)) (noting that the mere
grant of power to Congress compatible with the existence of similar power in states does not “imply
prohibition on states to exercise the same power”).
88. 362 F.3d 227, 239–40 (4th Cir. 2004). The Virginia dissemination statute was reenacted
as amended in 2000 and in its present form makes it unlawful to “‘sell, rent or loan to a juvenile’ . . .
or to knowingly display for commercial purpose in a manner whereby juveniles may examine and
peruse” the following:
1. Any picture, photography, drawing, sculpture, motion picture [film], electronic file or
message containing an image, or similar visual representation or image of a person or
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not reference or make use of its per se test; rather, it simply balanced the
two-fold Pike inquiry, which “first looks at the legitimacy of the state’s
interest and secondly weighs the burden on interstate commerce in light
of the local benefit derived from the statute.”89 The court held that the
burden—of applying the regulation to all Internet users, even those in
other states—outweighed any local benefit derived from the statute.90
B. State Cases: No Per Se Rule
Unlike federal cases addressing dormant Commerce Clause
challenges to state Internet regulations, state courts have consistently
rejected the Pataki reasoning and upheld state police power to regulate
Internet activity harmful to minors.91 These state cases have adopted
various approaches ultimately concluding that either Internet luring of a
minor is not legitimate commerce, and thus not subject to a dormant
Commerce Clause analysis, or that the state’s safety interest outweighs
the incidental burden on commerce.
1. People v. Foley
In People v. Foley, the Court of Appeals of New York upheld, under
the state’s police power, the constitutionality of a state luring statute
because the court determined the statute did not affect any legitimate
commerce.92 The New York luring statute copied the language of the
New York dissemination statute struck down in Pataki but added the
portion of the human body which depicts sexually explicit nudity, sexual conduct or
sadomasochistic abuse and which is harmful to juveniles, or
2. Any book, pamphlet, magazine, printed matter however reproduced, electronic file or
message containing words, or sound recording which contains any matter enumerated in
subdivision 1 of this subsection, or explicit and detailed verbal descriptions or narrative
accounts of sexual excitement, sexual conduct or sadomasochistic abuse and which, taken
as a whole, is harmful to juveniles.
VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-391 (Michie 1999) (amended 2000).
89. PSINET, 362 F.3d at 239–40.
90. Id. at 240.
91. See People v. Hsu, 99 Cal. Rptr. 2d 184 (Cal. Ct. App. 2000); People v. Foley, 731
N.E.2d 123 (N.Y. 2000); State v. Heckel, 24 P.3d 404 (Wash. 2001).
92. Foley, 731 N.E.2d 123 (N.Y. 2000). In this case, a fifty-one-year-old man discussed
sexually explicit acts and desires in an Internet chatroom with a person he believed to be a fifteenyear-old girl but who was actually an undercover police officer. Id. at 126. “During the conversation,
[Foley] sent ‘Aimee’ several pictures of ‘preteen girls and men’ engaging in sexual acts.” Id. As
Foley and “Aimee” engaged in their fifth online conversation within eight weeks, the police
executed a no-knock search warrant at Foley’s residence and found him typing at his computer,
engaged in a conversation discussing where he and Aimee could meet to have sex. Id.
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requirement that the communication be used to induce a minor to engage
in sexual or obscene performance for the benefit of the sender.93 The
court held that the statute did not implicate the dormant Commerce
Clause because the court could not “ascertain any legitimate commerce
that is derived from the intentional transmission of sexually graphic
images to minors for the purpose of luring them into sexual activity.”94
The court emphasized that without an effect on any legitimate
commerce, the conduct “deserves no ‘economic’ protection” and was
thus subject to the state’s police power.95
2. Hatch v. Superior Court
In Hatch v. Superior Court, a case similar to Foley, the California
Court of Appeals concluded that Pataki was inapplicable to the
California Internet luring statute for two reasons.96 First, the court
considered whether the state statute would subject Internet users to
inconsistent regulations. Although the court conceded that the Pataki
court’s analysis may be valid for bans “on the simple communication of
certain materials [which] may interfere with an adult’s legitimate
rights,”97 the court held that luring statutes fundamentally involve a
different purpose for communicating. The court explained that “a ban on
communication of specified matter to a minor for purposes of seduction
can only affect the rights of the very narrow class of adults who intend to
93. Id. New York Penal Law section 235.22 provides:
A person is guilty of disseminating indecent material to minors in the first degree when:
1. knowing the character and content of the communication which, in whole or in
part, depicts actual or simulated nudity, sexual conduct or sado-masochistic abuse,
and which is harmful to minors, he intentionally uses any computer communication
system allowing the input, output, examination or transfer, of computer data or
computer programs from one computer program to another, to initiate or engage in
such communication with a person who is a minor; and
2. by means of such communication he importunes, invites or induces a minor to
engage in sexual intercourse, oral sexual conduct or anal sexual conduct, or sexual
contact with him, or to engage in a sexual performance, obscene sexual
performance, or sexual conduct for his benefit.
N.Y. PENAL LAW § 235.22 (McKinney 2004) (emphasis added). The statute was enacted to
address the growing concern that pedophiles are using the Internet as a forum to lure children.
Foley, 731 N.E.2d at 128 (citing Governor’s Memorandum approving L. 1996, ch. 600, 1996
N.Y. LAWS 1900–01).
94. Foley, 731 N.E.2d at 133.
95. Id. (citing New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747, 761–62 (1982) (upholding a New York
statute under strict scrutiny to protect minors from dissemination of harmful materials)).
96. Hatch v. Superior Court, 94 Cal. Rptr. 2d 453, 471 (Cal. Ct. App. 2000).
97. Id. at 472.
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engage in sex with minors.”98 Accordingly, the court refuted the
inconsistent regulation argument from Pataki because “no case gives
such intentions or . . . communications”99 protection under the dormant
Commerce Clause. Second, the court held that the Pataki court’s
concerns for extraterritorial effects did not apply because all parties
involved in the solicitation were domiciled in California and were thus
subject to California law.100
3. People v. Hsu
In a subsequent case, the California Court of Appeals in People v.
Hsu upheld a state luring statute for different reasons.101 Unlike the
Foley court, the Hsu court conceded that state regulation of the Internet
triggers dormant Commerce Clause concerns because the “Internet is
undeniably an incident of interstate commerce.”102 Moreover, unlike the
Hatch court, the Hsu court applied the Pike balancing test to determine
the burden on interstate commerce.103 However, it concluded that the
mere “fact that communication . . . can affect interstate commerce does

98. Id.
99. Id.
100. Id. at 483–84.
101. 99 Cal. Rptr. 2d 184 (Cal. Ct. App. 2000). The California Penal Code states:
Every person who, with knowledge that a person is a minor, knowingly distributes, sends,
causes to be sent, exhibits, or offers to distribute or exhibit by electronic mail, the
Internet . . . , or a commercial online service, any harmful matter, as defined in Section
313, to a minor with the intent of arousing, appealing to, or gratifying the lust or passions
or sexual desires of that person or of a minor, and with the intent or for the purpose of
seducing a minor, is guilty of a public offense and shall be punished by imprisonment in
the state prison or in a county jail. A person convicted of a second and any subsequent
conviction for a violation of this section is guilty of a felony.
CAL. PENAL CODE § 288.2(b) (West 1997). The code defines “harmful matter” as:
matter, taken as a whole, which to the average person, applying contemporary statewide
standards, appeals to the prurient interest, and is matter which, taken as a whole, depicts
or describes in a patently offensive way sexual conduct and which, taken as a whole,
lacks serious literary, artistic, political, or scientific value for minors.
Id. § 313(a).
In People v. Hsu, undercover law enforcement personnel caught a man in ongoing sexual
communications involving explicit images with a teenage boy over the Internet. Hsu, 99 Cal. Rptr.
2d at 188–89. The defendant offered to engage in specific sexual acts with the boy and invited the
boy to meet him at his house. Id. at 189. Defendant appealed his conviction of two counts of
attempting to distribute or exhibit lewd matter to a minor through the Internet. Id.
102. Id. at 190.
103. Id.
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not automatically cause a state [Internet] statute . . . to burden interstate
commerce.”104
In its analysis, the court refuted each of the three dormant Commerce
Clause arguments presented in Pataki. First, the court rejected the Pataki
court’s per se analysis finding that “[a]bsent conflicting federal
legislation, states retain their authority under their general police powers
to regulate matters of legitimate local concern, even if interstate
commerce may be affected.”105 To the extent the statute resulted in
extraterritorial effects, the court determined that such effects should be
factored into the Pike balancing test.106 Second, under the Pike test, the
court determined that California has a “compelling [state] interest in
protecting minors from harm generally and certainly from being seduced
to engage in sexual activities.”107 The court found it difficult to conceive
any burden on legitimate commerce imposed by penalizing the
transmission of such harmful material to minors.108 Consequently, the
statute’s burden on commerce was “incidental at best and far outweighed
by the state’s abiding interest in preventing harm to minors.”109 Finally,
the court determined that the statute would not subject Internet users to
inconsistent regulations because the defendant generally is aware of the
victim’s location and the laws of that jurisdiction.110 Additionally, the
California statute reflected most jurisdictions’ laws prohibiting
solicitation of a minor.111
4. State v. Backlund
Synthesizing the reasoning from Foley and Hsu, the North Dakota
Supreme Court in State v. Backlund affirmed its state’s power to
narrowly regulate certain Internet communications by upholding the
104. Id.
105. Id.
106. Id.
107. Id.
108. Id.
109. Id.
110. Id. at 191.
111. See supra note 11. See generally CHARLES E. TORCIA, WHARTON’S CRIMINAL LAW §
285 (15th ed. 1995); 65 AM. JUR. 2D Rape § 11 (2004). Under the California statute, “[o]nly when
the material is disseminated to a known minor with the intent to arouse the prurient interest of the
sender and/or minor and with the intent to seduce the minor does the dissemination become a
criminal act.” Hsu, 99 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 191. Coupling this narrow scope with the penal scheme,
which requires the act to “occur wholly or partially within the state” to prosecute, the court found the
statute constitutional because it did not burden interstate commerce. Id.
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North Dakota luring statute.112 First, the court followed Foley, in finding
it “difficult to ascertain any legitimate commerce that is derived from the
willful transmission of explicit or implicit sexual communications to a
person believed to be a minor in order to willfully lure that person into
sexual activity.”113 Second, the court held that even if the state Internet

112. State v. Backlund, 672 N.W.2d 431 (N.D. 2003). In this case, Backlund participated from
his home in Minnesota in an Internet chatroom, using the screen name “backdaddyO.” Id. at 433. He
exchanged multiple messages with an individual using the screen name “Fargobabe 22,” who
identified herself as a fourteen-year-old girl, but who in actuality was a West Fargo police officer.
Id. Backlund solicited “Fargobabe 22” to engage in a sexual act, offering to pick her up and take her
home when they were done. Id. North Dakota charged Backlund with luring a minor by computer in
violation of the North Dakota luring statute, which criminalized the solicitation of minors over the
Internet. Id. The North Dakota Code provides the following:
An adult is guilty of luring minors by computer when:
1. The adult knows the character and content of a communication that, in whole or
in part, explicitly or implicitly discusses or depicts actual or simulated nudity,
sexual acts, sexual contact, sadomasochistic abuse, or other sexual performances
and uses any computer communication system that allows the input, output,
examination, or transfer of computer data or computer programs from one computer
to another to initiate or engage in such communication with a person the adult
believes to be a minor; and
2. By means of that communication the adult importunes, invites, or induces a
person the adult believes to be a minor to engage in sexual acts or to have sexual
contact with the adult, or to engage in a sexual performance, obscene sexual
performance, or sexual conduct for the adult’s benefit, satisfaction, lust, passions, or
sexual desires.
3. A violation of this section is a class A misdemeanor, but if the adult is twentytwo years of age or older or the adult reasonably believes the minor is under the age
of fifteen, the violation of this section is a class C felony.
N.D. CENT. CODE § 12.1-20-05.1 (2001). As originally introduced, the North Dakota statute
proscribed luring “a minor” but was amended during the legislative process to criminalize luring “a
person the adult believes to be a minor” to deal with situations in which minors misrepresent their
age to adults engaged in Internet solicitation of sexual acts. Hearing on S.B. 2035 Before the Senate
Judiciary Committee, 57th N.D. Legis. Sess. (Jan. 16, 2001) (oral testimony of Ladd Erickson,
Assistant Morton County State’s Attorney).
The Supreme Court of North Dakota, therefore, construed the code section to provide that an
adult is guilty of luring a minor by computer when
(1) the adult knows the character and content of a communication that explicitly or
implicitly discusses or depicts actual or simulated nudity, sexual acts, sexual contact,
sadomasochistic abuse, or other sexual performances, (2) the adult willfully uses any
computer communication system to initiate or engage in such communication with a
person the adult believes to be a minor, and (3) by means of that communication, the
adult willfully importunes, invites, or induces the person the adult believes to be a minor
to engage in sexual acts or have sexual contact with the adult, or to engage in a sexual
performance, obscene sexual performance, or sexual conduct for the adult’s benefit,
satisfaction, lust, passions, or sexual desires.
Backlund, 672 N.W.2d at 442.
113. Backlund, 672 N.W. 2d at 438.
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luring statute were to implicate the dormant Commerce Clause, “its
effect is incidental at best and far outweighed by the state’s abiding
interest in preventing harm to minors.”114
IV. ANALYSIS
The above review of state and federal dormant Commerce Clause
analyses demonstrates the variety of approaches courts have used,
ranging from the rigid per se analysis in Pataki and American
Booksellers to Foley’s determination that the dormant Commerce Clause
does not even apply to some state Internet statutes. The diverse reasoning
and interpretation of law in these cases leave us with the following
questions: (1) Do all forms of Internet activity constitute interstate
commerce for purposes of dormant Commerce Clause analysis? (2) In
reviewing state Internet statutes, when should courts apply a per se
analysis, and when should they apply the Pike balancing test? (3) How
should the Pike balancing test be applied to state luring statutes?
Ultimately, the best approach should balance state authority to
protect the welfare of their citizens against the federal interest of
facilitating interstate commerce by providing uniform Internet
regulations. This Comment concludes that the proper balance is struck
when courts understand that (1) not all Internet activity constitutes
“interstate commerce”; (2) the Pike balancing test should be applied
rather than the per se analysis in reviewing state Internet statutes
intended to protect citizens; and (3) state luring statutes should generally
be upheld under the Pike balancing test.
A. Not All Internet Activity Constitutes Interstate Commerce
Internet activity involving no economic trade—such as luring and
other forms of sexual predation—should not be subject to dormant
Commerce Clause scrutiny. However, as seen particularly in Pataki and
Hsu, many courts assume that Internet communication of any kind
involves interstate commerce. For example, Pataki held that the Internet,
by its nature, is entwined with interstate commerce because: (a) “many
users obtain access to the Internet by means of an on-line service
provider . . . , which charges a fee for its services,” and (b) “[t]he Internet
is more than a means of communication; it also serves as a conduit for
transporting digitized goods” similar to other “instruments of commerce”

114. Id.
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such as railroads, highways, and trucks.115 Thus, in Pataki, “[t]he
inescapable conclusion is that the Internet represents an instrument of
interstate commerce, albeit an innovative one; the novelty of the
technology should not obscure the fact that regulation of the Internet
impels traditional Commerce Clause considerations.”116 Similarly, but
without any analysis at all, Hsu also determined that “[t]he Internet is
undeniably an incident of interstate commerce.”117 Although these courts
may be justified in reaching their conclusions, the Internet, which
encompasses almost every aspect of modern life, demands a more
refined approach.
The problem lies in the fact that “interstate commerce” is a term used
to define both the extent of congressional power under Article I and the
limits of state power under the dormant Commerce Clause. Under Article
I, Congress can regulate a universe of subjects as long as they involve
“interstate commerce.” By contrast, the dormant Commerce Clause
prevents states from discriminating against “interstate commerce.”
Because both analyses depend on the meaning of “interstate commerce,”
an ill-defined and nebulous term, a reworking of terminology is
necessary. “Interstate commerce” should be defined, on the one hand, as
an enabling power and, on the other, as a blocking power. The following
discussion will illustrate how the term “interstate commerce,” at least for
purposes of the dormant Commerce Clause, is narrowly understood to
apply only to strictly commercial activities.
1. The Commerce Clause as an enabling power
Under Article I of the United States Constitution, Congress has
power to regulate commerce “among the several States.”118 The
Supreme Court has defined the scope of “interstate commerce,” for the
purposes of the Article I Commerce Clause analysis, into three general
areas: channels of interstate commerce,119 instrumentalities of interstate

115. Am. Libraries Ass’n v. Pataki, 969 F. Supp. 160, 173 (S.D.N.Y. 1997).
116. Id.
117. People v. Hsu, 99 Cal. Rptr. 2d 184, 190 (Cal. Ct. App. 2000). Notably, the Hsu court
reviewed and upheld a state luring statute as opposed to the dissemination statute that was struck
down in Pataki, 969 F. Supp. at 173.
118. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
119. See United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 609 (2000) (quoting United States v. Lopez,
514 U.S. 549, 558 (1995)) (“Congress may regulate the use of the channels of interstate
commerce.”).
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commerce,120 and “those activities that substantially affect interstate
commerce.”121 The Court generally interprets these three areas broadly
to include noneconomic activity. For example, “channels of interstate
commerce” include not only “intercourse and traffic between . . .
citizens, and . . . the transportation of persons and property,” but also
“the authority . . . to keep the channels of interstate commerce free from
immoral and injurious uses.”122 Thus, Article I enables Congress to
regulate nearly any activity, even those with marginal economic impact.
2. The Commerce Clause as a blocking power: the dormant
Commerce Clause
Contrary to the enabling power described above, the “negative”
aspect of the Commerce Clause—referred to as the dormant Commerce
Clause—acts to block state laws that discriminate against “interstate
commerce.” Because the dormant Commerce Clause is a blocking power
that limits a state’s sovereign police powers,123 “interstate commerce” is
120. Id. (“‘Congress is empowered to regulate and protect the instrumentalities of interstate
commerce, or persons or things in interstate commerce, even though the threat may come only from
intrastate activities.’” (quoting Lopez, 529 U.S. at 558)). Common examples of Congress’s authority
over such instrumentalities include the regulation of aircraft and thefts from interstate shipments. See
Perez v. United States, 402 U.S. 146, 150 (1971). This authority also extends to “interstate carriers
as instruments of interstate commerce” and
embraces the right to control their operations in all matters having such a close and
substantial relation to interstate traffic that the control is essential or appropriate to the
security of that traffic, to the efficiency of the interstate service, and to the maintenance
of conditions under which interstate commerce may be conducted upon fair terms and
without molestation or hindrance.
Houston E & W Texas Ry. v. United States, 234 U.S. 342, 351 (1914). Thus, for example, a railroad
is subject to congressional regulation as a “highway[] of both interstate and intrastate commerce”
because “[c]ars are seldom set apart for exclusive use in moving either class of traffic, but generally
are used interchangeably in moving both.” S. Ry. v. United States, 222 U.S. 20, 27 (1911).
121. Morrison, 529 U.S. at 609 (quoting Lopez, 514 U.S. at 559). This category of
congressional authority has been recently limited to activities constituting “some sort of economic
endeavor,” id. at 611, or “apparent commercial character.” Id. at 611 n.4.
122. Heart of Atlanta Motel v. United States, 379 U.S. 241, 256 (1964) (quoting Hoke v.
United States, 227 U.S. 308, 320 (1913)); see also United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100, 114 (1941)
(“Congress, following its own conception of public policy concerning the restrictions which may
appropriately be imposed on interstate commerce, is free to exclude from the commerce articles
whose use in the states for which they are destined it may conceive to be injurious to the public
health, morals or welfare, even though the state has not sought to regulate their use.”).
123. As sovereign entities, states have inherent police powers. See North Dakota v. United
States, 495 U.S. 423, 432 (1990) (“‘[A] State may, in the absence of conflicting federal regulation,
properly exercise its police powers to regulate and control such shipments during their passage
through its territory . . . .’” (quoting United States v. State Tax Comm’n, 412 U.S. 363, 377–78
(1973))); Hillsborough County v. Automated Med. Labs. Inc., 471 U.S. 707, 715 (1985) (“[W]e start
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defined narrowly to include only strictly commercial activity.124 More
precisely, “the dormant Commerce Clause’s fundamental objective [is
to] preserve[] a national market for competition undisturbed by
preferential advantages conferred by a State upon its residents or resident
competitors.”125
3. Enabling and blocking powers as applied to state police powers
Pataki and Hsu both failed to use the narrower, “blocking,”
definition of “interstate commerce” appropriate to the dormant
Commerce Clause.126 They assumed that, because a state regulation
with the assumption that the historic police powers of the States were not to be superseded by the
Federal Act unless that was the clear and manifest purpose of Congress.” (internal quotation marks
omitted) (quoting Jones v. Rath Packing Co., 430 U.S. 519, 525 (1977) (quoting Rice v. Santa Fe
Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 230 (1947)))); Milk Control Bd. v. Eisenberg Farm Prods., 306 U.S.
346, 351 (1939) (“One of the commonest forms of state action is the exercise of the police power
directed to the control of local conditions and exerted in the interest of the welfare of the state’s
citizens.”).
124. See, e.g., Kassel v. Consol. Freightways Corp., 450 U.S. 662 (1981) (dealing with state
regulation of truck lengths); Bibb v. Navajo Freight Lines, Inc., 359 U.S. 520 (1959) (considering
state regulation of truck mud flaps).
125. Gen. Motors Corp. v. Tracy, 519 U.S. 278, 299 (1997). The Court explained that
[o]ur system, fostered by the [dormant] Commerce Clause, is that every farmer and every
craftsmen shall be encouraged to produce by the certainty that he will have free access to
every market in the Nation, that no home embargoes will withhold his exports, and no
foreign state will by customs duties or regulations exclude them. Likewise, every
consumer may look to the free competition from every producing area in the Nation to
protect him from exploitation by any. Such was the vision of the Founders; such has been
the doctrine of this Court which has given it reality.
Id. at 299–300 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting H.P. Hood & Sons, Inc. v. Du Mond, 336
U.S. 525, 539 (1949)); see also Dennis v. Higgins, 498 U.S. 439, 448–49 (1991) (noting that “[t]he
Court has often described the Commerce Clause as conferring a ‘right’ to engage in interstate trade
free from restrictive state regulation” because it “was intended to benefit those who . . . are engaged
in interstate commerce”); Am. Trucking Ass’ns v. Scheiner, 483 U.S. 266, 280 (1987) (“The
Commerce Clause by its own force created an area of trade free from interference by the States.”
(internal quotation marks omitted)); Boston Stock Exch. v. State Tax Comm’n, 429 U.S. 318, 328
(1977) (“[T]he very purpose of the Commerce Clause was to create an area of free trade among the
several States.” (internal quotation marks omitted)); McLeod v. J.E. Dilworth Co., 322 U.S. 327, 330
(1944) (“The very purpose of the Commerce Clause was to create an area of free trade among the
several States.”).
126. See, e.g., Am. Library Ass’n v. Pataki, 969 F. Supp. 160, 172–73 (S.D.N.Y. 1997)
(reasoning that one participates in interstate commerce, for purposes of the dormant Commerce
Clause, by mere “consumption” of the Internet). Even state courts, other than People v. Foley, 731
N.E.2d 123, 132 (N.Y. 2000), concede that the Internet must be interstate commerce under the
dormant Commerce Clause. Foley, however, focused on the noneconomic act of luring and
solicitation and found that such behavior is not legitimate commerce and, therefore, “deserves no
economic protection.” Id. Although the Foley court recognized the role of legitimate commerce
(economic activity), it failed to distinguish the goal of free trade under the dormant Commerce
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involves the Internet, the statute must be regulating “interstate
commerce” in the broad enabling power sense. However, luring a minor
over the Internet is generally a noncommercial activity because it does
not involve commercial transactions and, as such, should not be subject
to the dormant Commerce Clause blocking power. Unfortunately, Pataki
and its progeny have interpreted interstate commerce as coextensive with
Congress’s power to regulate under the Commerce Clause. This
understanding subjects state regulations to dormant Commerce Clause
scrutiny whenever a state regulation involves the Internet.127 If courts
were to more clearly understand the distinction between the enabling and
blocking powers of the Commerce Clause, they would likely determine
that state luring statutes and many other forms of noncommercial state
Internet regulation do not involve “interstate commerce” and are thus
free from dormant Commerce Clause scrutiny.
B. The Pike Balancing Test Should Be Applied Rather than
the Per Se Analysis
The trend in federal courts to hold Internet regulatory state statutes
per se invalid when they have extraterritorial effects or the potential for
inconsistent regulation may prove to be too harsh, particularly when state
statutes aim at protecting the welfare of citizens. The Pike balancing test
is superior to a per se rule for four reasons.
First, the Supreme Court has never endorsed a per se test, except in
cases of facially discriminatory statutes. Although Pataki relies on Edgar
v. MITE Corp. and Healy v. Beer Institute to conclude that extraterritorial
regulation occurring wholly outside the states’ borders is per se
invalid,128 the Supreme Court has never mandated such a brightline rule.
Clause from the broad interpretation of “interstate commerce” under the Commerce Clause. See id.
at 132–33.
127. See, e.g., Am. Booksellers Found. v. Dean, 342 F.3d 96, 102–04 (2d Cir. 2003).
128. Pataki, 969 F. Supp. at 177. The court cited Edgar v. MITE Corp., 457 U.S. 624, 640
(1982), which struck down the Illinois Business Take-Over Act because it imposed an excessive
burden on interstate commerce by regulating conduct occurring wholly outside of the state. In
Edgar, the Illinois Business Take-Over Act required corporations to secure a percentage of Illinois
shareholders before an out-of-state corporation could purchase an in-state company. Id. The
Supreme Court struck down the Act for two reasons. First, the Act “directly regulate[d] and
prevent[ed], unless its terms [were] satisfied, interstate tender offers which in turn would generate
interstate transactions.” Id. Second, the Act imposed an excessive burden on interstate commerce. Id.
The Court further explained that “directly” regulating interstate tender offers included those tender
offers in other states and those “having no connection with Illinois.” Id. at 642 (emphasis added).
The Pataki court also cited Healy v. Beer Institute, 491 U.S. 324, 338 (1989), which held a
state statute unconstitutional when it “tie[d] pricing to the regulatory schemes of other states.” Healy
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In fact, the Edgar/Healy Courts balanced the state’s interest against the
burdens imposed on interstate commerce and invalidated the statute after
determining the burden was excessive because it regulated “commerce
occurring wholly outside that State’s borders.”129
Second, the Supreme Court has recognized the importance of
allowing states to regulate matters of local concern. As noted by Justice
Powell in Kassel, a state’s interest in safety is among “those that ‘the
Court has been most reluctant to invalidate.’”130 His further explanation
that such state interests carry a “strong presumption of validity”131
suggests that a balancing approach is preferred in such cases because a
per se approach would impose a myopic focus on the interest of interstate
commerce.
Third, the extraterritorial effects should be considered as part of a
balancing, rather than per se, analysis because all state Internet
regulations have extraterritorial effects to some degree or another. Pataki
is correct in noting that there is no way to limit the effects of a statute to
one state, but the mere fact that it has an extraterritorial effect does not
mean the state will not have an overriding interest.
Finally, when the extraterritorial effect of a state statute imposes
inconsistent regulations on Internet users, such an effect should not
render a statute per se invalid. Rather, the burden created by the
inconsistency should be balanced against its benefits, particularly when
the state seeks to protect the welfare of its citizens or when the
inconsistencies are relatively minor, as in dissemination and luring
statutes.

invalidated a statute that required only “out-of-state shippers [to] affirm that their prices [were] no
higher than the prices being charged in the border States as of the moment of affirmation.” Id. at
335.
Pataki and its progeny, however, misleadingly interpret the Edgar/Healy reasoning as
mandating a per se analysis whenever there is an extraterritorial effect. Rather, the Edgar/Healy
extraterritorial argument is only valid when “a state law . . . has the ‘practical effect’ of regulating
commerce occurring wholly outside that State’s borders.” Healy, 491 U.S. at 332. Consequently,
although a court may strike down a statute for regulating extraterritorial activity, it may only do so
when the state is attempting to regulate activity of which no part occurs within the regulating state.
Statutes aimed at protecting a state’s citizens, particularly minors, from harmful Internet activity,
such as pornography and luring, are clearly aimed at regulating communication partly, if not wholly
within the State. Therefore, it is improper to apply extraterritorial regulations as an independent test
in such circumstances.
129. Healy, 491 U.S. at 332.
130. Kassel v. Consol. Freightways Corp., 450 U.S. 662, 670 (1981) (quoting Raymond Motor
Transp. v. Rice, 434 U.S. 429, 443 (1978)).
131. Id.
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C. State Luring Statutes Should Withstand the Pike Balancing Test
Because the per se analysis is improper, dormant Commerce Clause
challenges to state Internet luring statutes should be reviewed, and
generally upheld, under the Pike balancing test. Under the Pike analysis,
a state’s compelling interest to protect minors from the psychological and
physical damage caused by sexual predators easily outweighs any burden
imposed on Internet commerce. Courts and commentators are only
beginning to understand the types of burdens such regulations may
impose,132 but the following discussion will describe the most pertinent
benefits and burdens that should enter into this analysis.
1. States have a compelling interest in protecting minors from sexually
explicit Internet materials
Backlund, Foley, Hatch, and Hsu each held that a state’s interest in
protecting minors from sexually explicit elements of the Internet was a
compelling one.133 The Supreme Court reached a similar conclusion in
New York v. Ferber, noting that “[i]t is evident beyond the need for
elaboration that a State’s interest in ‘safeguarding the physical and
psychological well-being of a minor’ is ‘compelling.’”134 The Court
132. For a discussion of unique ways in which the dormant Commerce Clause operates within
the context of the Internet, see Goldsmith & Sykes, supra note 8, at 814; Michael W. Loudenslager,
Allowing Another Policeman on the Information Superhighway: State Interests and Federalism on
the Internet in the Face of the Dormant Commerce Clause, 17 BYU J. PUB. L. 191, 243–56 (2003).
Loudenslager suggests that courts should recognize and account for “(1) the interactivity of a
Web site, (2) the type of goods sold on the site (whether tangible or electronic), and (3) the
availability of technology to verify the geographic location of site users.” Loudenslager, supra, at
197. Ultimately, he proposes that these three factors make up the substance of a Pike balancing
analysis. This Comment argues that although those three factors should be considered under Pike,
the Pike balance should additionally include factors such as extraterritorial regulation and
inconsistent regulations.
Goldsmith and Sykes, on the other hand, present Pike balancing, extraterritorial regulation,
and inconsistent regulations as three separate analyses for the constitutionality of state Internet
regulation. Goldsmith & Sykes, supra note 8, at 822–23. Unfortunately, the authors fail to
recommend specific factors under each analysis. The Goldsmith and Sykes article lacks a discussion
about which factors courts should consider under a benefit/burden analysis of the Internet and
dormant Commerce Clause. Although this Comment relies in part on and reaches essentially the
same conclusion as Goldsmith and Sykes, it differs from their article because it advocates specific
factors to consider under Pike.
133. See People v. Hsu, 99 Cal. Rptr. 2d 184, 190 (Cal. Ct. App. 2000); People v. Foley, 731
N.E.2d 123, 132 (N.Y. 2000); State v. Backlund, 672 N.W.2d 431, 437 (N.D. 2003).
134. 458 U.S. 747, 756–57 (1982) (quoting Globe Newspaper Co. v. Superior Court, 457 U.S.
596, 607 (1982)) (permitting New York to prohibit the distribution of sexually explicit material
depicting minors engaged in sexual performances).
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further emphasized that it has repeatedly “sustained legislation aimed at
protecting the physical and emotional well-being of youth even when the
laws have operated in the sensitive area of constitutionally protected
rights.”135
Although the Court decided Ferber over twenty years ago, the
advent of the Internet has more urgently made “[t]he prevention of
sexual exploitation and abuse of children . . . a government objective of
surpassing importance.”136 The year 2000 report of the National Center
for Missing and Exploited Children emphasized a state’s need to protect
its minor citizens.137 Although one-third of parents involved in the case
study had filtering or blocking software on their computer(s) at the time
of the interview, predators still accessed many of their children online
because filtering systems provide inadequate protection.138 This
inadequacy demonstrates the urgent need for state governments to bring
their resources to bear in preventing and ending the sexual solicitation of
minors over the Internet.
Furthermore, state luring statutes are likely to successfully protect
minors. Although Pataki suggested that dissemination statutes are
doomed to fail due to the multiple sources of Internet pornography, the
same cannot be said of state luring statutes. Such statutes are effective
because they allow law enforcement agencies, which are generally aware
of the predator through undercover chatroom contacts, to use
investigative resources to track down the identity of the offender and
keep logs of all online interactions as evidence of the crime.139
135. Id. at 757.
136. Id. (emphasis added).
137. See supra notes 1–2. The research concluded that approximately twenty percent of
children who use the Internet regularly were exposed to some form of sexual approach or solicitation
on the Internet. In that same year, one in thirty-three children received an aggressive solicitation,
defined as “offline contact,” in which the solicitor telephoned, sent letters, provided money or gifts,
or invited the child to meet somewhere. Id.
138. Id. For a discussion of the effectiveness of software filters, see Ashcroft v. ACLU, 124 S.
Ct. 2783, 2802 (2004) (Breyer, J., dissenting) (“[F]iltering software, as presently available, does not
solve the ‘child protection’ problem.”). In dissent, Justice Breyer, joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist
and Justice O’Connor, described four inadequacies of filter systems. First, filtering is often faulty,
permitting some pornographic material “to pass through without hindrance.” Id. Second, filtering
software costs money, an often large expense most American families are unable to afford. Id. Third,
parents must take an active role in regulating the filtering system to ensure its effectiveness and
utility—unfortunately, most parents are far too little involved in their children’s lives. Id. Finally,
“software blocking lacks precision.” Id.
139. See DAVID FINKELHOR ET AL., CRIMES AGAINST CHILDREN RESEARCH CENTER,
INTERNET SEX CRIMES AGAINST MINORS: THE RESPONSE OF LAW ENFORCEMENT (2003), available
at http://www.unh.edu/ccrc/pdf/CV70.pdf.
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2. The effects on interstate commerce are incidental
Admittedly, it is difficult to balance the interest of protecting a child
from exploitation against the interest of commerce. However, in cases
involving luring statutes, the burdens on interstate commerce are
incidental, compared to the costs that local communities would otherwise
incur when Internet predators are not checked. Courts should consider
the following factors when determining whether a state luring statute
imposes an undue burden on interstate commerce under the Pike test: (a)
the degree to which states may regulate activities occurring wholly
outside their borders, (b) the degree to which Internet users will be
subject to inconsistent regulations, and (c) the degree to which state
regulation will “chill” Internet use.140
First, a state Internet luring statute may affect, in theory,
communications occurring wholly outside the state, but this danger is
greatly reduced by most criminal jurisdiction statutes, which limit the
reach of state criminal laws to conduct occurring wholly or partly within
the state.141 Although Internet businesses may not always be able to
accurately determine the state in which a client lives, an Internet predator
is usually well aware of the location of his or her victim—especially
when proposing a meeting location. Thus, there is little danger that an
Internet predator will be unaware of the jurisdiction with which he is
dealing.
Moreover, there is little danger that an Internet predator will be
subject to conflicting state regulations because soliciting sex from a
minor is illegal in all jurisdictions.142 Against this uniform condemnation
of the sexual solicitation of minors, the fact that one state’s Internet
luring statute may differ from another’s does not impose a significant
burden on Internet users. As the Washington Supreme Court concluded
in State v. Heckel, a state Internet regulation that does nothing more than

140. See, e.g., New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747 (1982) (providing the specific language upon
which Backlund, Hsu, and Hatch rely in their Pike analysis concerning the compelling state interest
to protect minors from harmful materials).
141. See, e.g., UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-1-201(1)(a) (2003).
142. The common law has long-recognized the crime of rape and statutory rape, and all fifty
states apparently recognize such crimes. See generally, TORCIA, supra note 13, § 285 (citing state
law prohibiting statutory rape); 65 AM. JUR. 2D Rape §§ 11, 20 (2004) (noting that most jurisdictions
prohibit attempted statutory rape).
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impose a preexisting duty on Internet users is not an undue burden on
interstate commerce.143
143. State v. Heckel, 24 P.3d 404, 405 (Wash. 2001). In this antispam case, the Supreme Court
of Washington also rejected Pataki ’s handling of the Internet and dormant Commerce Clause. The
Washington Attorney General’s Office began investigating Jason Heckel after numerous recipients
of his mass e-mails filed complaints. As early as 1996, Jason Heckel of Oregon began sending
unsolicited commercial e-mail (UCE), or “spam,” over the Internet as part of his Natural Instincts
business. Id. at 406. “The booklet described how to set up an on-line promotional business, acquire
free e-mail accounts, and obtain software for sending bulk e-mail. . . . Heckel marketed the booklet
by sending between 100,000 and 1,000,000 UCE messages per week.” Id. Between 1997 and 1998,
Heckel developed, marketed, and sold a forty-six page online booklet entitled “How to Profit from
the Internet.” Id. The State of Washington filed three causes of action against Heckel, including a
claim under its state Consumer Protection Act (“the Act”). Id. at 407. The Act makes sending spam a
per se violation:
(1) No person may initiate the transmission, conspire with another to initiate the
transmission, or assist the transmission, of a commercial electronic mail message from a
computer located in Washington or to an electronic mail address that the sender knows,
or has reason to know, is held by a Washington resident that:
a. Uses a third party’s internet domain name without permission of the third party,
or otherwise misrepresents or obscures any information in identifying the point of
origin or the transmission path of a commercial electronic mail message; or
b. Contains false or misleading information in the subject line.
(2) For purposes of this section, a person knows that the intended recipient of a
commercial electronic mail message is a Washington resident if that information is
available, upon request, from the registrant of the Internet domain name contained in the
recipient’s electronic mail address.
Id. at 407 n.6 (quoting WASH. REV. CODE § 19.190.020 (1999)).
In considering the constitutionality of the Act, the court noted that even though some statutes
may “‘create additional, but not irreconcilable, obligations,’ they ‘are not considered to be
inconsistent’ for purposes of the dormant Commerce Clause analysis.” id. at 412 (citations omitted)
(quoting Instructional Sys., Inc. v. Computer Curriculum Corp., 35 F.3d 813, 826 (3d Cir. 1994)). To
support its reasoning, the court relied on Pike and disregarded Pataki. The court first established that
the Act was not facially discriminatory because it applied evenhandedly to all in-state and out-ofstate spammers. Id. at 408–09. Additionally, the court examined the Pike balancing test and noted
that contrary to recent Internet and Commerce Clause developments, which treat extraterritorial
regulation and inconsistent regulations as separate Commerce Clause tests, each of those two
“‘unsettled and poorly understood’ aspects of the dormant Commerce Clause” is actually a facet of
the Pike balancing test. Id. at 411. Consequently, in its Pike analysis, the court looked to other states
and found that most have also “passed legislation regulating electronic solicitations.” Id. at 411–12.
Moreover, the truthfulness requirement of the Act did not conflict with any requirements in other
states, and some other states’ statutes included additional requirements. Id. at 412.
Finally, in its Pike analysis, the court determined that spam causes economic harm to ISPs, to
actual users of forged domains, and to e-mail users. Weighing the economic harms to citizens
against the incidental burden of requiring truthfulness, the Washington Supreme Court found the Act
constitutionally sound under the Pike balancing test. The court heavily weighed the following factual
descriptions of burdens spam places on Internet users:
A federal district court described the harms a mass e-mailer caused ISP CompuServe:
In the present case, any value CompuServe realizes from its computer equipment is
wholly derived from the extent to which that equipment can serve its subscriber
base . . . . [H]andling the enormous volume of mass mailings that CompuServe
.

224

4SOR-FIN

191]

5/11/2005 12:04:39 PM

Internet Luring Statutes and the Dormant Commerce Clause

Finally, luring statutes are unlikely to have any type of “chilling
effect” on Internet commerce because they proscribe only a narrow range
of Internet activity. Most luring statutes are limited to Internet
communications in which the sender intends to engage in sexual activity
with the recipient knowing that the recipient is a minor. Thus, absent
such intent, most communications, including sexually explicit
communications between adults or even between adults and minors,
would not be affected. Similarly, Pataki ’s concern that “costs of
compliance, coupled with the threat of serious criminal sanctions for
failure to comply, could drive some Internet users off the Internet
altogether”144 fails to justify placing commerce above the welfare of
children. People who use the Internet to solicit minors will not lose any
legitimate commercial gains, and legitimate businesses will likely not run
afoul of Internet luring statutes.
.

V. CONCLUSION
As the “nuclear bomb of legal theory against state Internet
regulations,”145 the dormant Commerce Clause demands immediate
attention. As seen with the contrasting reasoning found in the recent
federal and state cases, the dormant Commerce Clause dilemma has
federal courts pitted against state supreme courts in a battle over
authority to regulate Internet communications. With staggering statistics
revealing that approximately twenty percent of children are solicited over
the Internet, three percent of whom receive aggressive sexual

receives places a tremendous burden on its equipment. Defendants’ more recent
practice of evading CompuServe’s filters by disguising the origin of their messages
commandeers even more computer resources because CompuServe’s computers are
forced to store undeliverable e-mail messages and labor in vain to return the
messages to an address that does not exist. To the extent that defendant’s
multitudinous electronic mailings demand the disk space and drain the processing
power of plaintiff’s computer equipment, those resources are not available to serve
CompuServe subscribers. Therefore, the value of that equipment to CompuServe is
diminished even though it is not physically damaged by defendants’ conduct.
Id. at 409 (citations omitted) (quoting CompuServe Inc. v. Cyber Promotions, Inc., 962 F. Supp.
1015, 1022 (S.D. Ohio 1997) (granting a preliminary injunction against a bulk e-mailer on the theory
of trespass to chattels)); see also Am. Online, Inc. v. IMS, 24 F. Supp. 2d 548, 550 (E.D. Va. 1998)
(relying on the reasoning of CompuServe and finding that a bulk e-mailer “injured AOL’s business
goodwill and diminished the value of its possessory interest in its computer network”).
144. Am. Library Ass’n v. Pataki, 969 F. Supp. 160, 180 (S.D.N.Y. 1997).
145. Goldsmith & Sykes, supra note 8 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting
McCullagh, supra note 8).
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solicitations,146 states should be allowed to protect children from such
threats.
Indeed, the Commerce Clause was never intended to impede states’
ability to protect children from sexual predators. Nevertheless, the
growing trend in federal courts is to preclude states from creating
Internet regulations. This narrow interpretation of the dormant
Commerce Clause, particularly one that allows courts to strike down
state statutes using a harsh per se approach, renders states powerless to
protect citizens from Internet harms. This Comment demonstrates that a
proper interpretation of the dormant Commerce Clause requires courts to
employ a balancing approach, which takes into consideration the state’s
purpose, the degree to which it regulates citizens of other states, the
danger of inconsistent regulations, and the potential for chilling Internet
commerce. Only when all these factors are considered will a court be
able to appropriately assess the validity of state Internet statutes in the
context of the federal system and the global communication network.
Within this framework, state and federal courts should readily uphold
state Internet luring statutes.
Julie Sorenson Stanger

146. ONLINE VICTIMIZATION, supra note 1, at 1.
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